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PROGRESS IN MATHEMATICS 
BY ELAINE KOPPELMAN 
GOUCHER COLLEGE t MARY LAND 
Progress in mathematics is a complex process and can occur 
by accretion of small advances as well as by major steps. 
Important concepts evolve slowly and are often used implicitly 
by generations of mathematicians before they are isolated and 
their role made manifest. At this stage there occurs a qual- 
itative change either in subject matter or in methodology. 
Major steps are usually triggered by attempts to solve difficult 
problems, to extend an existing field, to eliminate a paradox 
or dissatisfaction with the logical foundation of a field. To 
understand the way in which such obstacles are overcome in- 
volves not only technical matters, but also questions of psy- 
chology, sociology and history. 
It is not difficult to identify many such major steps in the 
history of mathematics, but their essential character as well 
as their consequences vary from case to case. Nevertheless, 
it is possible to devise a crude classification which is useful 
in providingaframework for more detailed inquiry. I will 
distinguish six major categories, five of which can be documen- 
ted: I. ORDERING, II. TRANSPLANTATION, III. FISSION, IV. FUSION, 
V. CONCEPTUAL GENERALIZATION, VI. PURE INVENTION. 
Table 1 lists these categories of steps, with their possible 
consequences, examples for each case, and some simple graphical 
symbols. 
I. ORDERING is the discovery of logical relationsips within 
an existing body of results. It may lead to the completion 
of a field (Ia) or to its rejuvenation (Ib). The latter occurs 
when an examination of the logical assumptions involved uncovers 
unexpected difficulties and inconsistencies or exposes new areas 
of investigation. An example of Ia is Weierstrass’s work on 
elliptic functions, which according to Morris Kline “completed, 
remodeled, and filled with elegance the theory of elliptic 
functions.” [S, p. 6511. The attempts to base the foundations 
of the calculus on algebra rather than geometry, the 19th centu- 
ry movement known as the arithmetization of analysis, showed 
that the concept of the real numbers itself required explica- 
tion and hence opened new fields of inquiry. I should point 
out, too, that fields which may appear at one time in history 
to be closed or completed may at a later time stimulate new 
developments in other fields and even to present new areas of 
research. But I am here speaking only of the immediate results 
which follow a major step. 
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II. By TRANSPLANTATION I understand the application of a 
specific technique borrowed intact from another field to 
solve a problem. Transplantation always leads to growth of the 
borrowing field, but has little immediate effect on the field 
from which the technique was borrowed. It is the most common 
type of step. Examples are the use of invariant theory in the 
theory of equations, and the application of group theory to 
differential equations. Most, though not all, applications of 
mathematics are examples of transplantation. 
III. FISSION occurs when a technique belonging to a parti- 
cular field is recognized as possessing a logical structure of 
its own, worthy of being developed into a theory independent of 
the original field. This is akin to Dieudonn6’s concept of 
"centers of radiation." The immediate effect is always the 
birth and growth of a new field. The parent field may either 
be stimulated (IIIa) or remain unaffected (IIIb). An example of 
IIIa is the breaking of ideal theory from the theory of numbers, 
while IIIb is represented by the detachment of vector analysis 
from quaternions. [a] DieudonnQ has given several examples of 
IIIa. 
IV. FUSION has been discussed in detail by DieudonnQ. It 
involves the combination of two (or more) existing fields or 
parts thereof and leads to the creation of a new, independent 
and always expanding field. The original fields may acquire 
new impetus through the fusion process (both in IVa, one only 
in IVb), or they may remain static (one in IVb and both in IVc). 
An example of IVa is the creation of homology theory from alge- 
bra and topology. Differential geometry in the 18th century 
is an example for IVb. Case IVc is the classical example of 
the fusion of elementary geometry with algebra into analytic 
geometry. In stating that geometry was static I mean that pure, 
or synthetic geometry was relatively neglected from the time 
of Fermat and Descartes until the 19th century. 
V. CONCEPTUAL GENERALIZATION involves a radical departure 
from the accepted meaning or scope of a basic concept. It can 
occur in conscious attempts to extend the boundaries of an 
existing field, such as in Cauchy’s work in complex integra- 
tion or as a consequence of an examination of logical struc- 
ture, such as in the foundation of non-euclidean geometry or 
Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers. It also occurs when 
transplantation (that is, attempts to apply old techniques 
either in mathematics or physics) fails, and it becomes neces- 
sary to develop new tools or to modify old ones. Fourier’s 
work is a classic example of how applications can lead to major 
developments in pure mathematics. Conceptual generalization al- 
ways leads to expansion of a field, but in addition it may have 
broad effects on mathematics in general. Non-euclidean geometry 
helped to redefine the subject matter of mathematical inquiry, 
while Cantor’s theory raised questions about the ontological 
status of mathematical objects. 
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VI. PURE INVENTION would be the creation of a new field 
without predecessors and with no relationship to existing prob- 
lems or concepts. It has probably never occurred. 
The preliminary classification presented here provides a 
useful basis for analyzing major individual steps which oc- 
curred in the progress of mathematics. The classification 
considers both the nature of the step involved, as well as its 
immediate effect. Some steps may be more complex events and 
may involve elements from several classes, while others may con- 
sist of coupled steps. For instance, fusion may involve con- 
ceptual generalization (in the sense of class V) and transplan- 
tation may lead to fission or fusion. Steps of class V are 
often the most revolutionary events. 
The classification can help to illuminate historical events. 
For example, the fact that invariant theory in the 19th century 
was involved in myriad transplantations, both as the donor 
and the receptor, explains why it was considered a unifying 
theme and the mathematics of the future. And that it never led 
either to fission or fusion may be the major reason it failed 
to fulfill these expectations. Finally, this classification 
may well be applicable to the history of the other sciences. 
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NOTES 
a. See Michael Crowe, History of Vector Analysis, Notre 
Dame (University of Notre Dame Press), 1967. The term vector 
analysis is used here not as a synonym for the theory of linear 
spaces, whose history is quite complex. It refers only to the 
geometric study of vectors in three space. 
DISCUSSION 
Immediately after Koppelman's talk, Dieudonne raised three 
objections: 
(1) To say that Weierstrass' work on elliptic functions 
was complete and final is only true in a very limited sense; 
Your example Ia is not valid. 
(2) What do you mean about the arithmetization of analysis 
being the subject of much controversy? Some people believe 
that this was a fantastic achievement in the late 19th century 
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and first half of the 20th century. Others, like myself, 
think that it is one of the most lifeless parts of mathe- 
matics, because it is perfectly useless as such. [Poincare 
seems to have taken the intermediate position (Proc. 1900 Int. 
Math. Congress, pp. 120-122) that it was a magnificent achieve- 
ment, but that it did not settle for all time (hence makes “life, 
less” for the research mathematician) the foundations of mathe- 
matics .--Ed.] I do not mean that the ideas introduced at that 
time were not useful; they turned out to be useful in different 
contexts, for instance in the context of the competition of a 
space or local ring. As far as real numbers are concerned, 
a mathematician needs to know only one thing: the properties 
of real numbers which he is allowed to use. Whether or not 
objects “exist” having the properties he is allowed to use 
(e.g., the axioms defining the real number system as a complete, 
Archimedean ordered field) is another question. All mathemati- 
cians believe that they exist. What Dedekind and Cantor and 
others showed was essentially that if you believe in the exist- 
ence of natural integers, then you must believe in the existence 
of real numbers. For a mathematician, the real line is just 
something in which he believes all the time. From the point of 
view of foundat ions, it was a great success and achievement of 
Dedekind and Cantor to have shown that if you believe in set 
theory, with either the usual axioms, or the Peano axioms, then 
you must also believe in the existence of real numbers. That 
was a major achievement, but for the practicing mathematician, 
it is completely worthless. 
Your example 3b of the evolution of vector analysis from 
quaternions gives a very limited view of linear algebra. 
Quaternions were a part of linear algebra but did not start 
from it. The two fundamental contributions to the founding of 
linear algebra were from Cayley and Grassmann. 
After Dieudonne’s remarks, the discussion shifted to ques- 
tions about the purpose of the introduction of such a taxonomy. 
Putnam remarked: “In general, it seems to me that taxonomy 
without theory is blind. In spite of the many disagreements 
I have with T. Kuhn’s book,[A9] I found that the distinction he 
introduced between paradigm change and normal science was of 
value because it permitted him to state certain generalities 
about science. Even though I disagree with such putative gen- 
eralizations about science, the fact that introducing a certain 
taxonomy enabled him to state a thesis is sufficient justifica- 
tion for the introduction of these concepts. Is your purpose 
in introducing these six categories to state some thesis or law 
about growth of science or mathematics, or just to construct a 
taxonomy?” 
Koppelman replied that her initial purpose was to provide a 
guide for working out specific cases, “For example, if you want 
to look at a particular advance in mathematics, if you are 
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studying the history of a certain idea, you might want to know 
how this specific field developed. It it fits a taxonomy I 
think that it can be useful to see if it can be covered, analyzed, 
and its components used to break it down.” 
“I am skeptical about that methodology,” Putnam added. 
“The historians of mathematics here today have talked entirely 
in generalities, and the mathematicians here are doing the his- 
tory of mathematics. I see two possible explanations: (1) de- 
fensiveness, a mistake which spoils the possibility of inter- 
change here, and (2) that the example of Kuhn has spread so, 
that now every historian has to produce generalities.” 
Birkhoff then cautioned, “The idea of developing a new 
science of historical analysis which is a pure science all by 
itself is a dangerous trend.... It is useful to have a rough 
descriptive classification of the different ways in which new 
theories are born, but we should not exaggerate the importance 
of such taxonomies .‘I 
Dieudonne then noted that Koppelman’s distinction between 
fusion and transplantation is exactly the distinction that 
Kline made about the two meanings of the word “fusion.” 
“This emphasis by the historians present on generalizations 
is quite a new thing in history,” remarked Kenneth May. “There 
is nothing like this in the literature of the history of mathe- 
matics; it is stimulated precisely by this meeting. There was 
a session on historiography at which historians of mathematics 
were asked to contribute. So they started to think about some 
generalizations in historiography.” 
The next question was raised by Jay Goldman. “There seems 
to be one development in the 20th century which I cannot quite 
fit into your chart, and I think that it underlies everything 
that Professor DieudonnQ said. It is the use of the axiomatic 
method as a research tool, or as Bourbaki would put it, once 
the fundamental structures are elaborated and systematized, they 
can be transplanted as a whole body into a new field.” 
Birkhoff answered, “If you see that a hypothesis is super- 
fluous, then you can generalize, obtaining the same conclusions 
under more general circumstances. The concept of a group is an 
axiomatic concept, and (as Mackey pointed out) an immensely 
powerful tool for generalizing harmonic analysis .‘I 
DieudonnQ added that there are good and bad axiomatic 
sys terns ; the distinction depends on the skill of the mathema- 
tician who is working on them. Goldman clarified his point 
further. “I mean that 20th century mathematics is, to a large 
extent, characterized by the fact that we use axiomatic systems 
not as a foundation, but as a way of organizing a body of know- 
ledge so that we can transplant it. This was not done in the 
19th century.” 
Browder then commented on Putnam’s original question. “YOU 
could transform Koppelman’s classification into a Kuhnian system 
if you wanted to. Her VI states that pure invention does not 
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exist; also, generalization is missing and is 
f 
resumably covered 
under fusion and transplantation. Her thesis that pure inven- 
tion does not exist] could be stated in a very strong and rather 
controversial form, and perhaps would look a little less vacuous 
in that form." 
Kahane stressed the difficulties present in the notion of 
a conceptual change. He said that it may be misleading in the 
history of mathematics, as what is now considered a conceptual 
change may, in time, be thought otherwise. He cited measure 
theory as an example. Continuing in this vein, Kahane stated 
that the evolutions of mathematical concepts are often concealed 
by conceptual changes. It was necessary to look for a new "in- 
vention" that was not expected or could not be explained. 
An example of this phenomenon was the quite isolated in- 
vention of best uniform approximation by Chebyshev in the middle 
of the 19th century. It came from a very practical question 
about mechanics; the interest of it escaped mathematicians. It 
was put in the form of a theory by Serge Bernstein, but was 
not in the frame of any general theory until the notion of a 
metric space appeared. As this took some time, it was not 
really recognized as a motivation in the field. Thus, histori- 
cal perspective does make a difference. 
The discussion returnedonceagaintoPutnam's claim that 
classification without theory is blind. Crowe reacted to Putnam's 
apparent implication that historians of mathematics should 
avoid theoretical questions about their subject by suggesting 
that it seemed ironic that a philosopher would suggest this. 
"There is a need among historians to have some theory in terms 
of which to order their historical materials." Crowe noted 
that Koppelman did not include in her classification a type of 
change which could be called "revolutionary," yet she had used 
this term at the end of her paper. "It seems to me that the 
word 'revolutionary' entails not only that something new came 
in, but also that some entity was deposed or discarded. Assuming 
this meaning of revolutionary, would you say that there have been 
any revolutionary changes in mathematics?" 
Koppelman replied, "Yes, I think there were, but I disagree 
with your definition of 'revolutionary if you say that 'revolu- 
tionary' means that the old must go out, in the sense that the 
old goes out in a revolution in science. A revolution in mathe- 
matics occurs not when old ideas are discarded as being wrong, 
but when their accepted scope and meaning are changed. For ex- 
ample, the word 'line' does not mean the same thing to a 20th 
century mathematician as it meant to Euclid, and the acceptance 
of the wider meaning of the term constituted a revolution." 
DieudonnQ agreed, noting that "a mathematical theorem can 
never be thrown out if it has been proven true. But it may be- 
come insignificant. On the other hand, it may look insignificant 
and in later years become a most fundamental thing." 
